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Abstract. This paper aims to measure the effectiveness of fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are 
constraints on fiscal policy that limit budgetary outcomes. Some studies in the literature 
have examined their effectiveness using a stringency index. Arguing this index possesses 
some arbitrariness, this study measured the effectiveness of fiscal rules using cluster 
analysis. This cluster analysis resulted in dividing the data into two clusters. Using panel 
data of 26 Swiss cantons plus the Swiss federation over the period 1990 - 2012, a Least 
Squares Dummy Variable econometric model was conducted. The findings indicate that 
fiscal rules have a favorable effect. It was found that the frameworks of cantons in cluster 1 
are more effective in decreasing cantonal deficits than those of cluster 2. Furthermore, it 
was found that cantons in cluster 1 have lower debt levels in comparison to cantons in 
cluster 2. 
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Highlights 
The aim of this research was to measure the effectiveness of fiscal rules. Some studies 
in the literature have examined their effectiveness using a stringency index. Arguing that 
the stringency index possesses some arbitrariness, this study measured the effectiveness of 
fiscal rules using another method: cluster analysis. This cluster analysis resulted in dividing 
the data into two clusters. The distribution among clusters 1 and 2 most likely depends on 
whether or not a canton implements fiscal rules. Using panel data of 26 Swiss cantons plus 
the Swiss federation over the period 1990 - 2012, fiscal rules were found to have a 
favorable effect. It was found that the frameworks of cantons in cluster 1 are more effective 
in decreasing cantonal deficits than those of cluster 2. Furthermore, it was found that 
cantons in cluster 1 have lower debt levels in comparison to cantons in cluster 2. For 
instance, fiscal rules in Z¨urich reduce the amount of realized deficits by a total of ca. 
300,000 CHF.  
In total, 1.7 million is the amount of deficits not realized in Switzerland due to fiscal 
rules. Moreover, debts not realized due to fiscal rules are 80 million in Zurich and 460 
million for Switzerland as a whole. These results are in line with the results of the literature. 
Accordingly, to answer the research questions, this study concludes that fiscal rules are 
effective in terms of realizing fiscal sustainability in the Swiss cantons. The fiscal rules’ 
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framework of cantons in cluster 1 is more effective than those in cluster 2. Concerning the 
regression analysis, both models used might have a problem of endogeneity. In both 
models, the fiscal balance and the cantonal debt were chosen to be dependent on the 
implementation of fiscal rules. However, a reverse relationship might additionally exist. 
The implementation of fiscal rules may be dependent on the fiscal balance and the debt 
level. Cantons with balanced fiscal balances and low debt levels will not need fiscal rules, 
as is the case of Appenzell Innerrhoden. This endogeneity problem is one limitation to this 
study. Another limitation, regarding the debt model, is the spurious regression mentioned in 
chapter 6. Therefore, one suggestion for future research is to find a way to solve the 
endogeneity problem.  Another suggestion is to carry over the research in this area to the 
developing countries. Would the implementation of fiscal rules be of benefit to the 
developing countries, especially in those countries where rules are not always applied? 
Finally, to obtain a sustainable fiscal policy it is recommended to implement a similar 
framework to the one of the Swiss debt brake. The Swiss federation and cantons have 
proven to control their deficits and decrease their debts by implementing the fiscal rules. 
 
Summary 
ome countries have high debt levels and accordingly face hardships as they 
struggle to repay their debts. Examples of such countries include Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and Portugal, and to a lesser extent Italy and France 
(Kirchgaessner; 2013). Most of these countries have reached a debt ratio that is 
above 100% of their GDP (Public debt; 2014). The discussion of public debt is a 
rich one because it affects the fiscal policy and its sustainability. Debt is a tool in 
the hands of the government that is double edged with the power of improving or 
worsening the welfare of society depending on how well it is managed. Fiscal rules 
are one of the tools used to manage debt. Many OECD countries try to avoid high 
levels of debt through the use of different fiscal rules. In Europe, the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in 1992 to control each country’s budget. According to this 
treaty, member countries of the EMU are required to keep their budget deficits 
below 3% of GDP and their public debt below 60% of GDP. Deviation from this 
rule is not allowed except in extraordinary cases like a severe economic downturn 
or a natural disaster. In the case of the United States, the Gramm-Rudman Hollings 
Act, passed in 1985, was meant to balance the federal budget and reduce the 
federal public debt. Similarly, in Switzerland, the federal debt sharply increased 
during the 1990s. In reaction, the Federal Council and the Parliament introduced 
the “debt brake” in 2003 (Niepelt and Schaltegger; 2013), which is a mechanism to 
limit expenditures (Bodmer; 2006). The main aim of this debt brake is to cease the 
increase of the debt level (Die Schuldenbremse des Bundes: Erfahrungen und 
Perspektiven; 2013). 
Besides the federation, most cantons of Switzerland have a debt brake. The 
Swiss cantons are a well suited ground to study the effectiveness of the fiscal rules 
due to the following reasons. First, there was a staggered introduction of the fiscal 
rules across cantons. The first fiscal rule was introduced in St. Gallen in 1929 and 
fiscal rules continued to be introduced until 2005. Second, the Swiss cantons are 
characterized by a high degree of fiscal autonomy, making their fiscal rules vary 
among each other. Third, despite their variation and autonomy, they share a 
common constitutional, political, and cultural background (Luechinger and 
Schaltegger; 2013) (Krogstrup and Waelti; 2008). Each canton designs its 
framework of a debt brake differently. Babuc and Mueller (2012) and Luechinger 
and Schaltegger (2013) have comprised the different fiscal rules that compose the 
debt brake for each canton and for the federation in a table. Further on, other 
authors studied the effects of the fiscal rules. For instance, Luechinger and 
Schaltegger (2013) studied the effects of fiscal rules on projected and realized 
fiscal outcomes. Also Krogstrup and Waelti (2008) find that fiscal rules continue to 
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have a significant effect on real budget balances. These researchers concluded that 
fiscal rules have a stronger effect on projected fiscal outcomes than on realized 
ones. Feld and Kirchg¨assner (2006) have investigated the effects of the 
constitutional clauses on public deficit and debt. Their study showed that fiscal 
constraints significantly reduce budget deficits. Chatagny (2013) found that fiscal 
rules reduce the effect of ideology on tax revenue projection errors. In general, the 
literature finds fiscal rules effective. To conduct these studies, the data on the fiscal 
rules of each canton and of the federation has to be divided into groups in order to 
be included in a regression. Dividing the data was done by placing the different 
cantons on an index according to the stringency of their fiscal rules. However, this 
stringency index possesses some arbitrariness, as will be explained later on. 
Therefore an alternative method is needed to measure the effect of the fiscal rules. 
This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of fiscal rules by using 
clustering technique to estimate the effects of the different frameworks of the debt 
brake. 
Through the use of a panel dataset comprising 27 cross-sections and 22 years, 
this research aims to answer the following questions: Are fiscal rules effective in 
realizing fiscal sustainability in the cantons of Switzerland? Which framework of 
fiscal rules is most effective? The aim of this research is to measure the 
effectiveness of fiscal rules. The motive for answering this question is to provide 
guidelines on how fiscal rules contribute to long-term fiscal sustainability. It can be 
shown that the fiscal rules’ frameworks of cantons in cluster 1 are more effective in 
decreasing cantonal deficits than those of cluster 2. As mentioned above, cluster 1 
includes the cantons with a debt brake framework that implements more fiscal 
rules. A potential theory for why a greater number of fiscal rules leads to less 
deficits include the possibility that citizens and politicians respond better to 
structure as structure provides clarity, cohesion and information. 
The results also show that cantons with different languages affect the fiscal 
budget differently. The coefficients of cantons who speak French or Italian is -
1.439 and -1.224 for cantons who speak more than one language. Contrary to the 
results of Feld and Kirchgaessner (2006), these results suggest that, on average, 
non-Germanspeaking cantons incur more deficits and less surpluses than German-
speaking cantons, Latin-speaking by 1.44 CHF per capita and cantons speaking 
more than one language by 1.22 CHF per capita. The different levels of deficits 
between Frenchspeaking and German-speaking cantons may reflect differences in 
certain expenditures that arise from cultural differences. According to Schwok 
(1993), most Frenchspeaking Swiss tend to believe in collectivist values while 
German-speaking Swiss tend to support individualistic ideals for historical reasons. 
In line with Schwok’s theory, local French-speaking governments may invest more 
in social services such as schools and hospitals while German-speaking 
governments may be more likely to invest in sectors that will benefit the individual, 
such as the private industry. The results also revealed that the elevation status of a 
canton affects the fiscal budget as well. Mountain cantons incur less deficits in 
comparison to non-mountain cantons by an average of 0.99 CHF per capita. It is 
possible that mountain cantons have smaller economies compared to non-mountain 
cantons, thereby decreasing the need for deficits. 
As for the urbanization status, urban cantons increase the fiscal balance more 
than rural cantons by 0.44 CHF. However, this relation could be random according 
to the results. It should also be mentioned that the category of mountain vs. non-
mountain status may overlap with urban vs. rural status as mountain cantons may 
be considered rural. Therefore, no conclusion can be confidently drawn from these 
two variables. In regard to the coefficient of population, this variable indicates that 
the effect of an additional one million citizens together on the fiscal balance is an 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(3), A. Levent, p.214-218. 
217 
increase of only 0.338 CHF. Obviously, this number is very small. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of this variable is insignificant. Therefore, it could be interpreted 
that either the population has no impact on the fiscal balance or the relationship 
between the population and the fiscal balance is non-linear. Referring to chapter 5, 
it is more likely that the second conclusion is the reason behind the insignificance 
of this variable. As Feld and Kirchgaessner (2006) explained, on one hand 
expenditure per capita decreases due to economies of scale for public goods. On 
the other hand, expenditure per capita increases due to indivisibility of some public 
goods. Hence we cannot conclude a direct relationship. Furthermore, in 
comparison to a finance minister affiliated to FDP, finance ministers affiliated to 
BDP, Gruene, PPN and independent finance ministers incur less deficits (higher 
surpluses) by an average of 0.13 CHF, 0.25 CHF, 0.16 CHF and 0.07 CHF per 
capita, respectively. On the other hand, finance ministers affiliated to CVP, LDP, 
LPS, SP and SVP will increase it by 0.04 CHF, 0.34 CHF, 0.39 CHF, 0.05 CHF 
and 0.12 CHF per capita, respectively. However, these numbers are not statistically 
significant, as well. So, for now, there is no proof of association between the party 
affiliation of the finance ministers and the fiscal balance. However, since the 
coefficient is insignificant, these relations can be due to chance. As for the party 
share in the government, the shares of all parties measured were each found to lack 
a significant relationship with the fiscal balance. Consequently, we can draw little 
conclusion between the constitution of the government and the fiscal balance. 
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